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Abstract 
 
We explore the effects of taxes and subsidies on job creation, job destruction, employment, 
and wages in the Mortensen-Pissarides version of the search and matching equilibrium 
framework.  Qualitative analytical results show that wage and employment subsidies increase 
employment, especially of low skill workers, and also increase wages. A job creation or 
hiring subsidy reduces unemployment duration but increases incidence with an ambiguous 
effect on overall employment.  A firing tax has the reverse effects but the same 
indeterminacy.  In the special case of a competitive search equilibrium, the one in which 
search externalities are internalized, there is a first best configuration: no tax on the wage, an 
employment subsidy that offsets the distortions on the job destruction margin induced by 
unemployment compensation and employment protection policy, and a hiring subsidy equal 
to the implicit tax on severance imposed by any form of employment protection, with the 
costs of these and other policies financed by a non-distortionary consumption tax.  
Computational experiments confirm this ideal also determines the direction in which 
marginal improvements can be made both in terms of efficiency and in terms of improving 
low skill worker employment and wage outcomes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Our purpose is to consider various tax and subsidy effects on wages and unemployment 
within the search and matching labor market framework.  This structure is the basis 
for the “flows” approach to aggregate labor market analysis. In Mortensen’s and Pis-
sarides’s (1994) version, an existing employment relationship commands quasi-rent as
a consequence of search and recruiting investment, hiring and firing costs, and other
forms of match-specific human capital formation. The quasi-rents that accrue to any
specific employer and worker pair are allocated between the parties by a wage contract.
Given a particular wage determination rule, employers provide jobs and recruit workers
while workers search for employment. At the same time, an existing employer-worker
match ends when suﬃciently bad news arrives about their expected future productivity.
These job creation and job destruction decisions generate worker flows into and out of
employment which depend on the current value of the employed stock. When the two
flows diﬀer, employment dynamics are set in motion which, under a reasonable set of
conditions, lead to a unique steady-state employment level.
The search and matching approach owes its origins to the pioneering works of Stigler
(1961), Phelps (1968) and Friedman (1968) and was already at an advanced state when
the Phelps et al. (1970) volume was published. The equilibrium analysis of the current
vintage of models, however, did not start until the early 1980s, when models by Diamond
(1982a, 1982b), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985, 1986) explored the properties
of two-sided search and characterized the nature and welfare properties of market equi-
librium. A key ingredient of the new approach was the use of the solution to the Nash
bargaining game to determine wages. The Nash solution is appropriate in this context
because of the assumptions of two-sided search and the symmetry that they introduce
to the game. It is also flexible enough to enable the study of market equilibrium under
a variety of assumptions about parameters, including policy ones.
The policy parameters studied in this paper are a job creation subsidy, an implicit
firing tax and a linear wage tax and employment subsidy imposed on continuing job-
worker matches. We investigate the eﬀects of each on job creation, job destruction,
employment and wages. Because analytical results are often ambiguous, we conduct
computational experiments that illuminate the model’s implications.
2 The Framework
2.1 Basic concepts
The Mortensen-Pissarides model is founded on two constructs, a matching function that
characterizes the search and recruiting process by which new job-worker matches are
created and an idiosyncratic productivity shock that captures the reason for resource
reallocation across alternative activities. Given these concepts, decisions about the cre-
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ation of new jobs, about recruiting and search eﬀort, and about the conditions that
induce job-worker separations can be formalized.
Job and worker matching is viewed as a production process. The flow of new matches
that form is the output of the process and the search and recruiting eﬀorts of workers
and employers are the inputs. The matching function gives the aggregate relationship
between matching output and the inputs. Under the simplifying assumptions that all
employers with a vacancy recruit with equal intensity and that unemployed workers
search, also at a given intensity, aggregate matching inputs can be represented simply
by the numbers of job vacancies v and the number of unemployed workers u.
Let the function m(v, u) represent the matching rate associated with every possible
vacancy and unemployment pair. As in production theory, it is reasonable to suppose
that this function is increasing in both arguments but exhibits decreasing marginal
products to each input. Constant returns in the sense that
m(v, u) = m(1,
u
v
)v ≡ q(θ)v where θ = v/u, (1)
is a convenient additional assumption, one that is consistent with available evidence.1
The ratio of vacancies to unemployment θ, market tightness, is an endogenous variable
to be determined.
On average, a vacant job is taken by a worker at the rate q(θ) and workers find jobs
at rate θq(θ). By the assumption of a concave and linear homogenous matching function,
q(θ) is decreasing and θq(θ) increasing in θ. θq(θ) is the unemployment duration hazard.
The duration of unemployment spells is a random exponential variable with expectation
equal to the inverse of the hazard, 1/θq (θ), a decreasing function of market tightness.
Analogously, q(θ) is the vacancy duration hazard and its inverse, 1/q(θ), is the mean
duration of vacancies.
An important source of job-worker separations is job destruction attributable to
an idiosyncratic shock to match productivity. Empirically this is the main reason for
job destruction (See Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)). Initial decisions regarding
location, technology, and/or product line choices embodied in a particular match are
irreversible in the sense that subsequent innovations and taste changes, not known with
certainty at the time of match formation, shock the market value of the product or
service output. For example, the initial decision might involve the choice of locating a
productive activity on one of many “islands”. In future, island-specific conditions that
aﬀect total match productivity, say the weather, may change. If the news about future
profitability implicit in the shock is bad enough, then continuation of the activity on
1See the survey by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
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that particular island is no longer profitable. In this case, the job is destroyed and the
match dissolves.
To model this idea, we assume that the output of each job is the product of two
components, p, which is common to all jobs in a particular skill group, and x, which is
idiosyncratic. The idiosyncratic component x, which takes values on the unit interval,
arrives from time to time at the Poisson rate λ and is distributed according to the c.d.f.
F (x) given an arrival. Note that these assumptions satisfy the empirical properties of
idiosyncratic job destruction, i.e. the shocks have persistence and they appear to hit the
job independently of the aggregate state or the skill of the worker (here represented by
p). Furthermore, the sequence of shocks are iid.
The parameter p represents the common productivity of a particular skill group. A
key assumption is market segmentation, i.e., skill groups are not linked though migra-
tion, rivalry in the job search process, or common wage-setting institutions. In other
words, each skill group participates in a separate labor market with its own match-
ing function, tax and subsidy structure, and employment-wage equilibrium. Under this
strong assumption, we can derive the equilibrium of one skill group without reference to
others.2 It will become obvious during the description of equilibrium why diﬀerent skill
groups experience diﬀerent equilibrium employment-wage configurations.
Under our assumptions about the information structure and the behavior of firms
and workers after the formation of a match, an existing match is destroyed if the idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock falls below some reservation threshold, an endogenous variable
denoted by R. Unemployment incidence is defined as the average rate of transition from
employment to unemployment, λF (R), and increases with the reservation threshold.
Entrepreneurs are unconstrained with respect to initial location, technology and
product choice and also have the same information about market conditions. Under the
assumption that they know the product or service that commands the highest expected
future profit, all will create jobs at the highest idiosyncratic productivity x = 1. Given
this property of the model and the assumption that future match product evolves accord-
ing to a Markov process with persistence, the jobs that are still at initial productivity
are the most productive for a given skill group. Note, however, this does not imply that
new jobs have greater expected duration, which would violate the empirical facts. All
jobs in our model, regardless of productivity, have the same expected duration, equal to
the inverse of the job destruction rate, 1/λF (R), given the assumption that the sequence
of shocks is iid.
2Implicit in the statement is the additional assumption that the labor services of members of two
diﬀerent skill groups are not substitutes for one another. The consequences of relaxing this assumption
are discussed in the final section of the paper.
4
As all workers are assumed to participate, the unemployed fraction of each skill group
evolves over time in response to the diﬀerence between the flow of workers who transit
from employment to unemployment and the flow that transits in the opposite direction,
i.e.,
u˙ = λF (R)(1− u)− θq(θ)u (2)
where 1− u represents both employment and the employment rate in each skill group.
The steady state equilibrium unemployment rate is
u =
λF (R)
λF (R) + θq(θ)
. (3)
As individual unemployment histories are described by a simple two-state Markov
chain, the steady-state unemployment rate is also the fraction of time over the long
run that the representative participant spends unemployed. It decreases with market
tightness and increases with the reservation product, because the unemployment hazard
θq(θ) and the employment hazard λF (R) are both increasing functions.
2.2 Job creation and job destruction
The sequence of events that lead to job creation and job destruction can be summarized
as follows. A firm with a profit opportunity opens a job vacancy for a worker with skill
indexed by p at a flow cost of recruiting equal to cp. Applications from workers begin
arriving at hazard rate q(θ(p)), and one is received on average 1/q(θ(p)) periods after
the posting of the vacancy. When they meet, worker and employer bargain. After the
initial wage w0(p) is agreed to, job creation takes place: the firm pays set-up cost pC,
which includes the cost of hiring, training and other forms of match specific investment.
Production then takes place, until a productivity shock arrives. Wage renegotiation
occurs with wage outcome w(x, p) prevailing on any continuing job, one that generally
reflects the new information x. However, if x falls below some reservation level R(p),
job destruction takes place: the firm pays firing cost pT and exits the market and the
worker enters unemployment. Here we have in mind an implicit firing tax, one imposed
by employment protection regulations that restrict ‘employment at will’, not a severance
transfer from firm to worker.3
Note that the vacancy-posting, job-creation and job-termination costs are assumed
to be proportional to the worker skill parameter. This reflects the reasonable assumption
3In the case of the principal wage contract assumed, such a transfer has no allocation eﬀect for
reasons pointed out by Lazear (1990) and Burda (1992).
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that it is more expensive to the firm to maintain a skilled job vacant than a less skilled
one and more expensive to train a more skilled worker to the special requirements of
the job (because the job is more demanding). The termination cost is an implicit tax,
and again the reasonable assumption is that it is more costly to get rid of a more skilled
worker than of a less skilled one. Of course, the assumption of proportionality is a
simplification that may not hold precisely in all situations. For example, termination
costs may increase with the wage rather than with productivity. Any other assumption,
however, would complicate the model considerably and the simulations show that results
with the proportionality assumption are reasonable.
The following policy parameters are studied. First, a job creation or hiring subsidy,
denoted as pH and defined as a payment made to the employer when a worker is hired.
Second, a linear labor tax-subsidy schedule, a + tw, imposed on employers. If t = 0,
the schedule corresponds to a pure employment subsidy when a < 0 and a lump-sum
employment tax if a > 0. If t > 0, the schedule corresponds to a progressive tax if
a < 0 and a regressive one if a > 0. For t < τ where τ represents the underlying payroll
tax, τ − t is a wage subsidy of the kind advocated by Phelps (1997). Third, as already
indicated, we also consider an explicit job destruction tax, pT as a policy instrument.
Finally, we allow for an unemployment compensation payment equal to some fraction
of the average wage for each skill group, ρw(p), where the fraction ρ is the replacement
ratio.
The policy-free equilibrium is one characterized by H = T = a = t = ρ = 0. Our
assumptions about the policy parameters are that in addition to the firing tax, the hiring
subsidy is also proportional to productivity, but the rates a, t and ρ are independent of
productivity. H is modelled as a hiring subsidy that is proportional to productivity for
convenience. Given the private cost of hiring, C, which is proportional to productivity,
p(C − H) is the net private job creation cost for each skill group p. That t and ρ are
independent of productivity needs no explanation, because they are both rates that
apply to equilibrium wage outcomes which depend on productivity. By making them
constant we restrict ourselves to linear schedules. a is treated as a flat (lump sum)
employment subsidy for keeping a worker employed, regardless of skill.
In addition to unemployment compensation, ρw¯(p), each unemployed worker enjoys
imputed income during unemployment b > 0. Crucially, this ‘income’ is independent of
skill. It is the imputed value of leisure (home production) to the worker although it
may include other incomes that must be given up when the worker moves from non-
employment to employment. The critical assumption is that the value of home produc-
tion to the worker is independent of market skill. This assumption is the reason that the
employment-wage configurations that we derive depend on skill: more skilled workers
enjoy on average lower relative returns from home production, b/p, and so they should be
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expected, on average, to have higher employment rates. In a general utility-maximizing
framework and in a (very) long-run equilibrium, b might depend on market productiv-
ity through wealth accumulation, a point emphasized by Phelps (see, for example the
Phelps and Hoon paper in this volume). We ignore such a dependence here.
A formal equilibrium model of unemployment requires specification of a production
technology, preferences, expectations, and a wage determination mechanism. Match
output is proportional to employment where the factor of proportionality, px, varies with
the worker’s skill level p and the job’s idiosyncratic shock x. Both workers and employers
maximize human wealth, defined as the expected present value of future net income
streams conditional on current information. Forward-looking rational expectations are
imposed. Wages are determined by a bilateral bargaining after the firm and worker
meet.
Given these assumptions, equilibrium market tightness, the ratio of vacancies to un-
employment θ(p), satisfies the following job creation condition: the expected present
value of the future return to hiring a worker equals the expected cost. Of course, a
hiring decision, implicit in the act of posting a job vacancy, is taken by an employer.
The equilibrium reservation product reflects the decisions of both parties to continue an
existing employment relationship. Individual rationality implies that separation occurs
when the forward looking capital value of continuing to either party is less than the
capital value of separation. For joint rationality, the sum of the values of continuing the
match must be less than the sum of the values of separating, otherwise a redistribution
of the pair’s future incomes can make both better oﬀ. Whether these job destruction
conditions also satisfy the requirements of joint optimality depends on the wage mecha-
nism assumed. For a given wage determination mechanism, a search equilibrium is a pair
(R(p), θ(p)) for each skill level p that simultaneously solves these job creation and job
destruction conditions. Given our assumptions of market segmentation along skill lines,
we can ignore from now on in the notation the functional dependence of all equilibrium
mappings on p.
A wage contract, formally a pair (w0, w(x)), is composed of a starting wage w0 ∈ <
and a continuing wage function w : X → < that obtains after any future shock to match
specific productivity. Implicit in this specification is the idea that a worker and an
employer negotiate an initial wage when they meet and then subsequently renegotiate
in response to new information about the future value of their match.4
4Note that contracts of this form are instantly “renegotiated” on the arrival of a new idiosyncratic
shock. MaCleod and Malcomson (1993) persuasively argue that the initial wage need not be renegotiated
until an event occurs that would otherwise yield an ineﬃcient separation. Contracts of this form may
well generate more realistic wage dynamics but job creation and job destruction decisions are the same
under theirs and our specification, provided the initial wage does not violate any non-negativity or
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A continuing match has specific productivity x and the worker is paid a wage w(x).
Given that the match ends in the future if a new match specific shock z arrives which
is less than some reservation threshold R, its capital value to an employer, J(x), solves
the following asset pricing equation for each p :
rJ(x) = px− a− (1 + t)w(x) + λ
Z 1
R
[J(z)− J(x)]dF (z) + λF (R)[V − pT − J(x)] (4)
where r represents the risk free interest rate, V is the value of a vacancy, and a, t and
T are policy parameters. An analogous relationship implicitly defines the asset value of
the same match to the worker involved, W (x). Namely,
rW (x) = w(x) + λ
Z 1
R
[W (z)−W (x)]dF (z) + λF (R)[U −W (x)] (5)
where U is the capital value of unemployment.
Given a match product shock z, the employer prefers separation if and only if its
value as a vacancy V exceeds the value of continuation J (z) plus the firing cost pT.
Similarly, the worker will opt for unemployment if and only if its value, U, exceeds
W (z). Given that under our wage rule both J (z) andW (z) are increasing (see below),
separation occurs when a new value of the shock arrives that falls below the reservation
threshold
R = max {Re, Rw} (6)
where J(Re) = V − pT and W (Rw) = U. Because in the bilateral bargain wealth is
transferable between worker and employer, the separation rule should be jointly optimal
in the sense that it maximizes their total wealth. The necessary and suﬃcient condition
for joint optimization is that R = Re = Rw where J(R) + W (R) = V − pT + U , a
condition that holds only for an appropriately designed wage contract.
Although the idiosyncratic component of a new job match is x = 1, the expected
profit from a new match may be diﬀerent from J(1), as defined in (4), because of the
existence of the job creation cost, pC, and the policy parameters pH and pT.We therefore
introduce the notation J0 for the expected profit of a new match to the employer and
write the asset pricing equation for the present value of an unfilled vacancy, V, as
rV = q(θ)[J0 − V − p(C −H)]− pc (7)
other (e.g. minimum wage) constraints. Hence, for the purpose at hand, there is no relevant diﬀerence.
However, their observation does suggest a possible explanation within our framework for the observed
“stickiness” of wage rates, which, nonetheless, is not a cause of “under-employment” equilibria.
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where pc is the recruiting cost flow per vacancy held, pC is a fixed cost of hiring and
training a new worker plus any other match specific investment required and pH is the
hiring subsidy given by the government. Similarly, the value of unemployment solves
rU = b+ ρw¯ + θq(θ)[W0 − U ] (8)
where b is the flow of imputed income during unemployment and ρw¯ is the unemployment
compensation: ρ is a policy parameter and w¯ is the mean wage for the skill group. Note
that the opportunity cost of employment is invariant with respect to the worker’s skill
as reflected in the parameter p by assumption.
Given an initial wage equal to w0, the asset pricing relation implies that the initial
value of a match to employer and worker respectively satisfy
rJ0 = p− a− (1 + t)w0 + λ
Z 1
R
(J(z)− J0) dF (z) + λF (R)[V − pT − J0]. (9)
and
rW0 = w0 + λ
Z 1
R
(W (z)−W0) dF (z) + λF (R)[U −W0] (10)
where (J(x),W (x))represents the values of match continuation defined above.
Free entry requires that new vacancies are created until the capital value of holding
one is driven to zero, i.e.,
V = 0 ⇔ pc
q(θ)
+ p(C −H) = J0. (11)
As the expected number of periods required to fill a vacancy is 1/q(θ), the condition
equates the cost of recruiting and hiring a worker to anticipated discounted future profit
stream. The fact that vacancy duration is increasing in market tightness guarantees
that free entry will act to equate the two.
2.3 Wage determination
The generalized axiomatic Nash bilateral bargaining outcome with “threat point” equal
to the option of looking for an alternative match partner is the baseline wage specification
assumption found in the literature on search equilibrium.5 Given that the existence of
5See Diamond (1981,1982b), Mortensen (1978, 1982), and Pissarides (1986,1990).
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market friction creates quasi-rents for any matched pair, bilateral bargaining after worker
and employer meet is the natural starting point for an analysis.6
Given the notation introduced above, the starting wage determined by the generalized
Nash bargain over the future joint income stream foreseen by worker and employer
supports the outcome
w0 = argmax
n
[W0 − U ]β (S0 − (W0 − U))1−β
o
subject to the following definition of initial match surplus
S0 ≡ J0 − p(C −H)− V +W0 − U. (12)
In the language of axiomatic bargaining theory the parameter β represents the worker’s
relative “bargaining power.” Analogously, the continuing wage contract supports the
outcome
w(x) = argmax
n
[W (x)− U ]β (S(x)− (W (x)− U))1−β
o
where continuing match surplus is defined by
S(x) ≡ J(x)− V + pT +W (x)− U. (13)
The diﬀerence between the initial wage bargain and subsequent renegotiation arises for
two reasons. First, hiring costs are “sunk” in the latter case but “on-the-table” in the
former. Second, termination costs are not incurred if no match is formed initially but
must be paid if an existing match is destroyed.
The solution to these two diﬀerent optimization problems satisfy the following first
order conditions
β (J0 − V − p(C −H)) = (1− β)(1 + t) (W0 − U) (14)
and
β (J(x)− V + pT ) = (1− β)(1 + t) (W (x)− U) (15)
where β, the worker’s “bargaining power” is the resulting worker’s share of match surplus
in the absence of taxes. But when there is marginal taxation the worker’s share falls,
6See Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986), Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) and Wolinsky
(1987) for applications of Rubinstein’s strategic model model in the search equilibrium framework.
Although the precise form of the wage contract can diﬀer under alternative specifications of the stategic
bargaining game, all outcomes that are eﬃcient from the perspective of any employer-worker pair yield
the same job destruction decisions. Job creation decisions, however, may diﬀer, because they depend
on the share of the surplus going to one side only.
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because firm and worker realize that they can pay less tax (a net loss to the pair) by
reducing the negotiated wage. As an immediate consequence of (15), it follows that the
reservation threshold R, defined by equation (6) is jointly rational, i.e., it solves
S(R) = J(R)− V + pT +W (R)− U = 0.
In order to solve for the equilibrium (θ, R) pair, we first use the asset value equations
and the sharing rules to solve for initial wages and wages in continuing jobs:
w0 = (1− β)(b+ ρw¯) +
β
1 + t
[p− a+ pcθ − (r + λ)p(C −H)− λpT ] (16)
and
w(x) = (1− β)(b+ ρw¯) + β
1 + t
[px− a+ pcθ + rpT ] (17)
The dependence of these wages on the policy parameters needs some explanation.
Both wage functions depend on a and t, because all jobs pay these taxes. The em-
ployment tax a reduces job surplus directly, so it is simply deducted from the match
product before the latter is shared. The marginal tax t influences the share going to
each party in the bargaining outcome. Specifically, because t aﬀects the marginal rate
at which the surplus can be traded between worker and employer, the tax rate influences
the net share of match product obtained by the worker. The similarity between the two
wage functions, however, stops there. The net job creation cost p(C −H) reduces the
initial wage, because the cost is conditional on an agreement to form the match and
hence must be shared. But once the job is formed, the creation cost is sunk and as such
does not influence wages in continuing jobs. The firing cost pT reduces expected match
surplus at the creation date and so reduces the initial wage for that reason. However,
once the job is formed, the firing tax is an employer liability if the job is destroyed. This
fact strengthens the worker’s hand in the wage bargain and so pushes the negotiated
wage up for continuing workers. Equation (17) reflects the fact that the second influence
dominates the first so the wage in continuing matches goes up by the introduction of
the firing cost.7
7From an accounting perspective, the worker pays her share of expected amortized cost of termination
at the first shock, βλpT/(1+ t), in the form of a lower wage flow over the period prior to the first shock
arrival. Subsequently, she earns the market return on the prior ‘forced saving’, equal to βrpT/(1 + t),
as long as the match continues.
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3 The Solution
3.1 Market equilibrium
It remains to substitute the wage equations into the asset value equations and the job
creation and job destruction conditions, in order to derive overall market equilibrium.
Substitution into the job value conditions yields
(r + λ)J0 = (1− β)[p− (1 + t)(b+ ρw¯)− a]− βpcθ + β(r + λ)p(C −H)
+βλpT + λ
Z 1
R
J(z)dF (z)− λF (R)pT (18)
and
(r + λ)J(x) = (1− β)[px− (1 + t)(b+ ρw¯)− a]− βpcθ − βrpT
+λ
Z 1
R
J(z)dF (z)− λF (R)pT. (19)
Jobs are destroyed when
J(R) + pT = 0. (20)
Equations (18), (19) and (20) imply the job creation condition
J0 = (1− β)p
µ
1−R
r + λ
− T
¶
+ βp(C −H), (21)
and the job destruction condition
R+
λ
r + λ
Z 1
R
(z −R)dF (z) = a+ (1 + t)(b+ ρw)
p
+
β
1− β cθ − rT. (22)
Finally, from (11) and (21) θ is the solution to
(1− β)
µ
1−R
r + λ
− T − C +H
¶
=
c
q(θ)
. (23)
In (22), the reservation product, R, plus the option value of continuing the match
attributable to the possibility that match product will increase in the future, the left
side, equals the match continuation opportunity cost flow, the right side of the equation.
Higher market tightness increases the reservation productivity because the worker’s out-
side options improve with θ. For given market tightness, both the firing tax and the
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employment and wage tax increase the reservation productivity and consequently reduce
the surplus value of a continuing match.
In (23), the left side is the firm’s share of the expected net surplus attributable to
a newly created job. The right side is the expected recruiting cost. Higher reservation
productivity implies a shorter expected life of a new job and so desired job creation and
with it market tightness fall. For given reservation productivity, higher job creation or
job destruction costs reduce desired job creation as well.
Now, (22) and (23) can be represented by two curves in R × θ space, the former
sloping up and the latter sloping down, for reasons just explained. This is shown in
Figure 1. Hence there is an equilibrium pair (R∗, θ∗) for each p which is unique. Of
course, the ratio of vacancies to unemployment must be strictly positive (θ > 0) in any
meaningful equilibrium. Indeed, the following conditions are necessary but not generally
suﬃcient:
1 > (r + λ)(C −H + T ) (24)
p(1 + rT ) > a+ (1 + t)(b+ ρw¯).
Satisfaction of these two conditions restricts the magnitude of hiring and firing costs and
the income while unemployed relative to the level of average productivity.
Outcome variables of interest include the unemployment rate, the average wage and
aggregate income per participant. Given the equilibrium pair (R∗, θ∗), the associated
unemployment rate u is determined by the Beveridge equation (3).
For given θ, the wage equations (16) and (17) define the equilibrium wage schedules
in new and continuing jobs, respectively. As the steady state fraction of newly created
jobs is F (R) while the fraction of continuing jobs with idiosyncratic productivity x or
less is F (x)− F (R), the average wage is simply
w = w0F (R) +
Z 1
R
w(x)dF (x). (25)
After rearranging terms and substituting from (16) and (17) into (25) one obtains,
w = w0F (R) + (1− F (R))w(R) +
βp
1 + t
Z 1
R
(x−R)dF (x)
= (1− β)(b+ ρw) + β
1 + t
·
p ((1−R)− (r + λ)(C −H + T ))F (R)
+p(R+ rT )− a+ pcθ +
R 1
R
(x−R)dF (x)
¸
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Therefore, the equilibrium conditions (22) and (23) imply
w = b+ ρw +
pβ
(1 + t)(1− β)
"
c
q(θ) ((r + λ)F (R) + θq(θ))
+r(1−β)
r+λ
R 1
R
(x−R)dF (x)
#
. (26)
Finally, aggregate income per participant, the sum of market output net of recruiting
and job creation costs plus unemployment output, can be written as
y = p
·
F (R) +
Z 1
R
xdF (x)
¸
(1− u) + bu− pcv − pCm(v, u) (27)
= p
·
F (R) +
Z 1
R
xdF (x)
¸
(1− u) + (b− pcθ − pCθq(θ))u.
Given unemployment, income increases with the reservation product and decreases with
market tightness
The diﬀerences between the equilibrium employment-wage combinations of skilled
and unskilled workers can be seen with the help of figure 1. Inspection of the equations
for the two curves, (22) and (23) shows that diﬀerences in the skill parameter p are
reflected in diﬀerences in the location of the job destruction curve (22). Higher p implies
that the job destruction curve lies at a lower position than it does with lower p. So
skilled workers, who have the higher p, experience equilibrium outcomes with lower R
and higher θ, i.e., for given unemployment, lower job destruction rate and higher job
creation rate. The Beveridge curve then implies that the unemployment rate for skilled
workers is lower in equilibrium. The wage equations also imply that the wage rate for
skilled workers is higher, partly because of their higher productivity but also because of
the more tight skilled markets.
Equation (22) makes clear why there are diﬀerences between the equilibrium com-
binations of the two skill groups. In the absence of policy, both skilled and unskilled
workers have the same imputed value of leisure but diﬀerent market returns. So the more
skilled workers gain more from employment, relative to their home returns, giving rise
to their higher employment rates. With policy, the gain is aﬀected by the employment
subsidy and the tax rate (but not by the unemployment benefit, which is proportional
to wages), both of which are independent of skill.
3.2 Comparative Static Results
The tax parameters a and t, as well as the supply price of labor, b, and unemployment
compensation, ρw, all shift the job destruction curve up but have no direct eﬀect on the
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job creation curve. As a consequence, the equilibrium value of the reservation thresh-
old increases and the equilibrium value of market tightness falls. Hence, steady state
unemployment increases because both unemployment duration and incidence increase
in response. Wages, however, increase in b and ρw but fall in the tax instruments. It
follows that if we interpret a fall in a financed by a lump-sum consumption tax as an
employment subsidy, both employment and wages rise in response. A fall in t has similar
eﬀects.
Now, because the eﬀect of both a and t on employment is inversely proportional to p,
the general productivity of a skill group, the eﬀect of taxing or subsidizing employment
by a given amount is larger for low-skill groups. Of course, if employment subsidies were
proportional to the average skill level in each case, the diﬀerential eﬀect of employment
subsidies would disappear. But then the authorities would be spending a lot more on
subsidizing skilled employment than unskilled. Also, the diﬀerential eﬀects of the tax
rate would remain. The reason for the diﬀerential eﬀects of tax rates, if we ignore
employment subsidies, is that leisure activities are not taxed. Therefore, the eﬀect of
the tax is the same as the eﬀect of a subsidy on home activities. Because low-skill
groups have higher imputed income from home production, a given percentage subsidy
has bigger impact on behavior. If home production were taxed, or if it depended on
wealth that was taxed, directly or indirectly, the eﬀect would disappear in the long run.
With flat-rate subsidies and untaxed home production, it would be beneficial in terms
of overall employment to tax high-skill groups and use the revenue to subsidize low-skill
groups. The employment benefit at the lower end of the skill distribution outweighs
the loss at the top end. In the wage equations, the eﬀect of diﬀerent a on wages is the
same across all occupational groups. But the eﬀect of diﬀerent t is higher for higher-skill
groups than for lower ones. So a uniform tax should reduce wage inequality. Of course,
taxing high-skill groups and subsidizing low-skill groups should also reduce inequality.
An increase in the hiring subsidy H inflates demand and consequently shifts the job
creation curve up in Figure 1. Both the equilibrium reservation threshold and market
tightness rise in response, inducing respectively a decrease in unemployment duration
and an increase in unemployment incidence. Hence, the net eﬀect on steady-state un-
employment is qualitatively indeterminate. Initial wages also increase with H but wages
in continuing jobs are not directly aﬀected, except to the extent that the rise in tight-
ness increases them. It follows that if the government subsidizes job creation, it reduces
unemployment duration but increases unemployment incidence. It also increases wages,
especially those of newly hired workers.
Changes in the firing tax T have more complicated eﬀects on unemployment duration
and incidence. An increase in T shifts both the job destruction curve and the job creation
curve down. Although the eﬀect on market tightness appears ambiguous, a formal
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diﬀerentiation of the equilibrium conditions yields a negative net eﬀect on both R and θ.
Still, because of the negative eﬀect of firing costs on job creation, the qualitative eﬀect
on steady state unemployment is indeterminate. Initial wages fall with T but wages in
continuing jobs rise, thus making the wage-tenure profile steeper.
4 Computation Experiments
In this section, we present computed solutions to the model that provide some numerical
feel for its policy implications. Parsimonious functional forms are assumed. Some of the
parameters are set at reasonable values while others are chosen to match unemployment
spell durations and incidences typically experienced by workers in the US economy. Two
diﬀerent initial labor policy configurations are considered, one in which the unemploy-
ment benefit replacement ratio is moderate and unemployment protection legislation is
weak, as in the US, and another in which both the level of unemployment compensation
and the extent of employment protection are relatively high, as in Europe. The simu-
lated numerical eﬀects of employment and hiring subsidies are reported for each case for
both ‘high’ and ‘low’ skill workers.
4.1 Functional forms and baseline parameters
The matching function is log-linear. Formally,
q(θ) = θ−η (28)
where without loss of generality the scale parameter is normalized to one (this assump-
tion simply determines the units in which v, and so θ, are measured) and η is the constant
elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment. The distribution of
the idiosyncratic shock to match productivity is uniform over the interval [γ, 1], i.e.,
F (x) =
x− γ
1− γ . (29)
The baseline parameter used for the two policy cases under study are presented in
Table 1. The normalized skill parameter value p = 1 is interpreted as the initial match
product of a worker of average ability. The diﬀerence between the two policy scenarios
involves the values of the policy parameters ρ and T . In case 1, the replacement ratio is
set equal to 0.2 and there is no employment protection policy, a specification consistent
with the OECD characterization of US policy (see OECD, 1994).
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The numerical analysis abstracts from the possible eﬀects of search externalities by
considering only the case of an eﬃcient equilibrium solution to the model, that is ob-
tained by imposing the condition β = η. As is well known, this condition internalizes the
eﬀects of the search externalities on the equilibrium outcome (Hosios, 1990, Pissarides,
1990). In the initial calibration exercise, the wage tax t is set equal to a typical payroll
tax rate of τ = 0.2. This payroll tax, used in virtually all countries to finance social
security expenditures, is possibly a bit high in a US context and definitely too low for
the typical European country.
After setting all the other parameter values as in Mortensen (1994), unemployment
output b and the lower shock bound γ are chosen so that the steady state unemployment
rate, u, equals 6.5 percent and the average duration of an unemployment spell, 1/θq(θ),
is one quarter, values which reflect US experience in the past twenty years. In case 2,
the policy parameters are set to obtain the same steady state unemployment rate but
an average unemployment duration twice as long, about six months. This case, one in
which unemployment spells are longer but less frequent, reflects European experience
(see OECD, 1994), at least until the recent run up in long term unemployment. These
assumptions, the other parameter values, and the model imply a case 2 replacement
ratio consistent with those observed in Europe, ρ = 0.34, and an implicit firing cost,
T = 0.78, which is roughly equal to the average quarterly wage in the benchmark model.
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Case 1: ‘US Policy’ Case 2: ‘EU Policy’
Match product p 1 1
Interest rate r 0.02 0.02
Shock arrival rate λ 0.1 0.1
Lower shock support γ 0.646 0.646
Duration elasticity η 0.5 0.5
Recruiting cost c 0.3 0.3
Creation cost C 0.3 0.3
Value of leisure b 0.349 0.349
Payroll tax rate τ 0.2 0.2
Firing tax T 0 0.78
UI replacement ratio ρ 0.2 0.35
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4.2 Outcomes
Outcome variables include the steady state unemployment rate, average wage, and aggre-
gate income. After solving for the equilibrium (R, θ) pair, unemployment is computed
using the Beveridge equation (3). Equations (26) and (27) are used to calculate the
average wage and aggregate income per participant respectively.
In Tables 2 and 3, outcome variable values are reported for both policy scenarios
and two levels of worker ‘skill’. For each outcome variable, case, and work skill type,
both the actual simulated value and the ‘first best’ value are reported along with an
employment subsidy and hiring subsidy that will implement first best. First best is
defined as the equilibrium where the eﬀect of all policy instruments combined on the
(R, θ) pair is zero. From ((22) and (23), given that β = η, first best is a configuration
of the policy instruments that satisfies
a+ (1 + t)(b+ ρw¯)− rpT = b (30)
and
H = T. (31)
In working out the simulated first best solution, we treat T, ρ and t as parameters and
H and a as the ‘unknowns’ of the simultaneous solution of (30) and (31); i.e. we look for
a hiring subsidy and an employment subsidy that will oﬀset the eﬀects of the tax, firing
restrictions and unemployment benefit on the equilibrium outcome. ‘High skill’ workers
are assigned a productivity parameter of p = 1.4 while low skill are assigned p = 0.75.
Given the normalization p = 1 for the productivity parameter of an average worker,
these are the average calibrated values derived in Millard and Mortensen (1996) using
1990 aggregate US earnings data by educational attainment if one defines ‘low skill’ as
those with a high school diploma or less and ‘high skill’ as those with more than a high
school education.
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Table 2: Outcomes: High Skill (p = 1.4)
Case 1 (ρ, T ) = (.2, 0) Case 2 (ρ, T ) = (.34, .78)
Actual First Best Actual First Best
Unemployment rate u 5.3 4.2 4.5 4.2
Average wage w 1.08 1.41 1.03 1.71
Aggregate income y 1.25 1.26 1.25 1.26
Replacement ratio ρ 0.2 0.2 0.34 0.34
Firing cost T 0.0 0.0 0.78 0.78
Wage tax t 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Employment subsidy −a 0.0 0.41 0.0 0.75
Hiring subsidy H 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.78
For high skill workers in the ‘US’ policy scenario, the first best unemployment rate
is only 1 percentage point less than the actual in policy case 1 and 3/10th of a point in
policy case 2 and there is little overall welfare loss attributable to passive labor market
policies as measured by aggregate income per participant in either case. However, the
average wage after first best is attained by subsidizing employment is much larger than
the actual in both cases.
There are two interrelated reasons for such a large response in the wage to an em-
ployment subsidy. First, a higher subsidy has a direct positive eﬀect on wages but also
increases unemployment compensation given a fixed replacement ratio which in turn
induces a second round increase in the wage. (See equations (16) and (17)). Second, the
induced increase in unemployment compensation increases the distortion further which
causes a need for a second round increase in the subsidy to achieve first best. As a
consequence of these multiplier processes, the wage increases by almost the amount of
the subsidy, 0.41, in spite of the fact that the workers’ share of the direct subsidy is only
equal to β = 0.5.
For ‘low skill’ workers the employment and eﬃciency gains are large. Even in the
‘US’ policy scenario, actual unemployment is twice first best and aggregate output per
participant is almost 2% less than potential. In policy case 2, characterized by high un-
employment compensation and strict employment protection, the actual unemployment
rate is three times first best and first best output is over 3% larger than actual. In both
cases, the wage is again augmented by almost the size of the subsidy.
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Table 3: Outcomes: Low Skill (p = 0.75)
Case 1 (ρ, T ) = (.2, 0) Case 2 (ρ, T ) = (.34, .78)
Actual First Best Actual First Best
Unemployment rate u 9.0 5.2 16.2 5.2
Average wage w 0.588 0.796 0.563 0.965
Aggregate income y 0.679 0.684 0.651 0.684
Replacement ratio ρ 0.2 0.2 0.34 0.34
Firing cost T 0 0 0.78 0.78
Wage tax t 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Employment subsidy −a 0 0.261 0 0.452
Hiring Subsidy H 0 0 0 0.78
4.3 Marginal Eﬀects of an Employment subsidy
An employment subsidy is an employment-contingent flow paid throughout the duration
of a job-worker match. This contrasts with a wage subsidy, which can be regarded as a
reduction in the payroll tax. We report results with wage subsidies normalized by the
average wage, i.e., if a is the flat employment subsidy, we report results for a range of s
values, where s is defined by
s = −a/w. (32)
The normalization in (32) helps in the comparison with a wage subsidy in the fol-
lowing sense. Define a wage subsidy by a reduction in the tax rate t. The cost to the
government of this reduction is tw¯, so a reduction of the tax by an amount s is compara-
ble to an employment subsidy of s as defined in (32), in the sense that to finance either
requires the same consumption tax. Now, from (22) and (23), if an employment subsidy
s were enacted, its eﬀect on equilibrium would be a displacement of (22) by an amount
sw¯/p. If a wage subsidy of s were oﬀered, its eﬀect would be a displacement of the same
condition by an amount s(b + ρw¯)/p. Because a meaningful equilibrium requires that
unemployment income be less than income from work, i.e. b+ ρw¯ < w¯, the eﬀect of an
employment subsidy per dollar of consumption tax dominates that of a wage subsidy
(holding ρw¯ constant). Thus, it is cheaper to use an employment subsidy to achieve
whatever eﬀect on the employment outcome is desired than to use a wage subsidy. But
the eﬀects of the two policies on wages are diﬀerent, as the wage equations (16) and
(17) make clear. A reduction of t by an amount s and a reduction of a by an amount
sw¯ both increase wages at all productivity levels, but because mean wages have to be
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less than productivity in a meaningful equilibrium, a wage subsidy has bigger eﬀect on
wages than an employment subsidy of the same value.
In what follows we consider only the marginal eﬀects of an employment subsidy s,
as defined in (32). The values considered in the simulations range from 0 to 20% of
the average wage. The upper bound is equal to the size of the underlying payroll tax
assumed in the experiment and in all cases is less than the level required to attain
first best (See Tables 2 and 3). In all likelihood, it also exceeds the magnitude of any
politically feasible subsidy.
The computed numerical eﬀects of the employment subsidy on the unemployment
rate and the other two outcome variables, the average wage and aggregate income per
participant, for both policy scenarios and skill levels are reported in Table 4. The subsidy
is expressed as a percentage of the initial average wage and the wage and income eﬀects
are stated as percentage changes relative to their initial values to facilitate comparison.
Table 4 sends a clear message. Although an employment subsidy reduces unemploy-
ment in all cases, the eﬀect is virtually non-existent for a worker of high-skill, p = 1.4,
under either policy scenarios. However, the low-skill unemployment rate falls substan-
tially with the employment subsidy, although much more so under a ‘European’ policy
regime, case 2, than under a ‘US’ policy regime, case 1. For a worker of high skill there is
virtually no eﬃciency gain to be realized over the employment subsidy range under con-
sideration, despite the unemployment fall, but the average worker’s wage does increase,
at the rate of 80 cents on a dollar of subsidy.
In the low-skill worker case, the allocation eﬀects are dramatic, particularly under the
case 2 policy scenario. Even when policy is of the ‘US’ variety, case 1, the unemployment
rate falls from 9 to 6.7 percent as the subsidy increases from zero to 20% of wages. When
employment protection policy restricts reallocation and unemployment compensation is
high as in Europe, the model suggests that eﬃciency gains are substantial as well. For
example, a 20% subsidy induces a 4% increase in income. Furthermore, unemployment
falls from 16% to less than 8% and again wages increase with the subsidy at a rate of
roughly 80 cents on the dollar in both cases.
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Table 4: Eﬀects of an Employment Subsidy
Subsidy Un Rate Income Wage Un Rate Income Wage
High Skill: p = 1.4
Case 1: (ρ, T ) = (0.2, 0) Case 2: (ρ, T ) = (0.34, 0.78)
100s u ∆y/y ∆w/w u ∆y/y ∆w/w
0 5.4 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0
4 5.1 0.0 3.2 4.3 0.0 3.2
8 5.0 0.1 6.4 4.1 0.0 6.5
12 4.8 0.1 9.6 3.9 0.0 9.7
16 4.7 0.1 12.9 3.8 0.0 13.1
20 4.5 0.1 16.1 3.6 0.0 16.2
Low Skill: p = 0.75
Case 1: (ρ, T ) = (0.2, 0) Case 2: (ρ, T ) = (0.34, 0.78)
100s u ∆y/y ∆w/w u ∆y/y ∆w/w
0 9.0 0.0 0.0 16.2 0.0 0.0
4 8.4 0.2 3.2 12.8 1.6 3.1
8 7.9 0.3 6.3 10.8 2.4 6.2
12 7.4 0.4 9.5 9.4 2.9 9.4
16 7.0 0.5 12.7 8.4 3.2 12.6
20 6.7 0.5 15.0 7.6 3.4 15.8
In conclusion, an employment subsidy financed with a non-distortionary consump-
tion tax has large positive eﬀects on both the employment level and the wage earned.
This conclusion is particularly true of low-skill workers in a regime of high unemployment
compensation and employment protection. Furthermore, the subsidy oﬀsets eﬃciency
distortions induced by the payroll tax used to finance social security programs, by un-
employment compensation, and by employment protection policy.
4.4 Marginal Eﬀects of a Hiring subsidy
In this section, the simulated eﬀects of a job creation subsidy are reported. A hiring
subsidy is a payment that can be either a direct transfer to the employer or a tax rebate
made to oﬀset job creation costs. As pH is the subsidy per worker hired and the gross
hiring rate is the product of the unemployment hazard and the unemployment rate, a
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comparable measure is the total hiring subsidy flow divided by the total wage bill, i.e.,
s =
pHθq(θ)u
w(1− u) . (33)
This measure is expressed in the same units as a wage subsidy and an employment
subsidy normalized by wage.
The unemployment eﬀects of a hiring subsidy for both policy cases and both worker
skill groups are reported in Table 5. As reflected in equation (33), the gross subsidy
flow is expressed as a percentage of the total wage bill for comparison with the results
for an employment subsidy reported in Table 4. Like the former table, wage and income
eﬀects are stated as percentage changes relative to their initial values, also to facilitate
comparison.
The eﬀect of the hiring subsidy on unemployment is positive in three of the four
cases but negative for ‘low skill’ workers in policy scenario case 2. Recall, the qualitative
eﬀect of a hiring subsidy is theoretically ambiguous for the following reason. By making
the cost of job creation less expensive, job creation is stimulated. However, a tighter
market induces more job destruction as well because the opportunity cost of a match
rises with θ. Unemployment increases when the latter positive eﬀect on unemployment
incidence exceeds the former negative eﬀect on unemployment duration.
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Table 5: Eﬀects of a Hiring Subsidy
Subsidy Un Rate Income Wage Un Rate Income Wage
High Skill: p = 1.4
Case 1: (ρ, T ) = (0.2, 0) Case 2: (ρ, T ) = (0.34, 0.78)
s u ∆y/y ∆w/w u ∆y/y ∆w/w
0 5.3 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.0 0.0
4 6.2 -0.4 5.1 6.2 0.8 6.0
8 7.0 -1.5 11.1 7.7 -0.1 13.8
12 7.7 -3.4 17.9 8.8 -2.1 23.3
16 8.3 -6.1 25.4 9.8 -5.9 34.4
20 8.9 -9.5 33.8 10.5 -11.2 47.3
Low Skill: p = 0.75
Case 1: (ρ, T ) = (0.2, 0) Case 2: (ρ, T ) = (0.34, 0.78)
100s u ∆y/y ∆w/w u ∆y/y ∆w/w
0 9.0 0.0 0.0 16.2 0.0 0.0
4 9.6 -0.3 4.6 15.0 1.7 4.6
8 10.2 -1.2 9.9 14.8 2.1 10.3
12 10.6 -2.7 15.8 14.5 1.3 17.0
16 11.0 -4.8 22.3 14.5 -0.0 24.7
20 11.3 -7.4 29.4 14.5 -3.1 33.5
When unemployment compensation is low and there is no employment protection
policy, the ‘US’ policy case 1, unemployment increases with the hiring subsidy for both
high and low skill workers. However the reverse is true for low skill workers in the
‘EU’ policy case 2 characterized by high unemployment compensation and stringent
employment protection. Furthermore, the subsidy decreases aggregate income by a
substantial amount in case 1 for workers of both skill levels but can generate increases
in case 2. The reason for this diﬀerence would seem to be the implicit firing cost of
employment protection present in case 2. The hiring subsidy oﬀsets the negative eﬀect
of the firing cost on job creation and on aggregate income. That wages are bid up by a
hiring subsidy in all cases is confirmed. Indeed, the wage is much more responsive to a
hiring subsidy than to an employment subsidy increase of comparable size.
The lessons learned from this computational experiment are also clear. A hiring
subsidy can decrease both employment and eﬃciency essentially by encouraging too
much replacement of old jobs by new through creative destruction. Indeed, a hiring
subsidy is welfare improving only to the extent that it oﬀsets the negative eﬀects of
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firing costs on job creation, as the earlier first best analysis indicated.
4.5 A Self Financing Employment Subsidy and Wage Tax
As a non-distortionary consumption or lump sum tax is not a practical possibility in
fact, the results reported above overstate the net eﬀects of employment and hiring sub-
sidies by an amount equal to the dead weight loss of some alternative form of taxation.
Furthermore, the only alternative in this environment, an income tax, is equivalent to
a wage tax if employers can fully expense recruiting and training costs, as is the case
under the US tax code. Hence, any employment subsidy must ultimately be financed by
an oﬀsetting increase in tax on labor earnings.
Because the distortion caused by a dollar collected from a wage tax is less than
the oﬀsetting eﬀect of using that dollar to subsidize employment on the same worker,
a fact noted above, employment, wage, and welfare improvements can be achieved in
principle by increasing the wage tax and using the proceeds to subsidize employment
even if there were only one worker type. However, the computed consequences of this
policy (not reported here) are quite small, as one might expect, over a reasonable range
of the subsidy and associated required tax.
Suppose instead one were to levy a surtax on high-skill workers and use the proceeds
to target an employment subsidy to low-skill workers. To the extent that our previous
results show that the impacts of the policy parameters are much larger for low-skill
workers, this form of cross subsidization is likely to increase both the wage and the
employment of low wage workers significantly with only a small negative eﬀect on the
wage and employment of high wage workers.
The results of a computational experiment along these lines are reported in Table 6.
These numbers are obtained by calculating the market equilibrium for ‘low’ and ‘high’
skill workers simultaneously when the two markets are interconnected by a government
budget constraint. As the wage surtax above and beyond the baseline payroll tax, t− τ ,
levied on the ‘high-skill’ workers must cover the cost of a ‘low-skill’ employment subsidy
−a = sw1, the constraint can be written as
(t− τ)w2(1− u2)`2 = sw1(1− u1)`1 (34)
where (1 − ui)`i is the equilibrium level of employment, `i is the fraction in the labor
force, and wi is the average wage of workers in skill group i respectively given that
i = 1(2) denotes the low (high) skill type. Reflecting the fact that about half of the
US labor force have more than a high school education in the 90s, the computations in
Table 6 reflect the assumption that `1 = `2 = 0.5.
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Table 6: Eﬀects of a ‘Low-skill’ Subsidy
and ‘High-skill’ Surtax
Subsidy Low-skill p = 0.75 High-skill p = 1.0 Income Surtax
Policy Case 1: (ρ, T ) = (0.2, 0)
100s u1 ∆w1/w1 u2 ∆w2/w2 ∆y/y 100(t− τ)
0 9.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
4 8.4 3.2 5.4 -1.7 0.1 2.1
8 7.9 6.3 5.4 -3.5 0.1 4.4
12 7.4 9.5 5.5 -5.2 0.1 6.7
16 7.0 12.7 5.5 -7.0 0.1 9.2
20 6.7 15.9 5.6 -8.8 0.1 11.8
Policy Case 2: (ρ, T ) = (0.34, 0.78)
100s u1 ∆w1/w1 u2 ∆w2/w2 ∆y/y 100(t− τ)
0 16.2 .0 4.5 0.0 0. 0.0
4 12.8 3.1 4.6 -1.6 0.5 2.0
8 10.8 6.2 4.6 -3.3 0.8 4.2
12 9.4 9.4 4.7 -5.1 1.0 6.6
16 8.4 12.6 4.8 -6.9 1.1 9.0
20 7.6 15.8 4.9 -8.7 1.1 11.6
The results reported in Table 6 are quite encouraging. Over the rather reasonable
low-skill employment subsidy range equal to 0 to 20% of earnings, the low-skill unem-
ployment rate falls by over 2 points under the ‘US’ style policy and by more than half,
from 16 to less than 8 percent, in the ‘European’ policy regime with very little impact
on the level of unemployment of the high-skill workers in either case. Although the
surtax on high-skill worker earnings lowers the wage of high-skill workers, the low-skill
wage increases by twice as much in percentage terms. Furthermore, the low-skill wage
increases by between 77 and 80 cents on the dollar of employment subsidy over the
range studied in both policy cases. Hence, the combined subsidy-tax policy promotes
considerable wage equality. At the same time, the level of aggregate income increases
in response to the subsidy, particularly when unemployment compensation is high and
employment protection is stringent.
Note that the cross wage tax and employment subsidization policy studied in this
section is a reallocation scheme similar to the “earned income” tax credit that is part of
the US income tax code. Like the credit in combination with a progressive income tax,
those who earn more pay a higher marginal tax rate while those with low earnings receive
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an employment contingent income supplement. Indeed, in the environment under study
the two schemes are formally equivalent because an employment subsidy has the same
eﬀects as an employment contingent payment made to the worker and the incidence of
a wage tax is independent of whether it is the employer or the worker who actually pays
it.
5 Conclusions and a Future Research Agenda
In the paper, we derive the eﬀects of wage, employment, and hiring subsidies on job
creation, job destruction, employment, and wages implied by an extended version of the
Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model of labor market equilibrium. Qualitative analytical
results show that wage and employment subsidies increase employment, especially of
low skill workers, and also increase wages. A job creation or hiring subsidy reduces
unemployment duration but increases incidence with an ambiguous eﬀect on overall em-
ployment. A firing tax has the reverse eﬀects and also has an indeterminate employment
eﬀect.
Because a pure consumption tax has no eﬀect on resource allocation decisions in
the environment modeled, a first best tax and subsidy configuration always exists even
when an unemployment compensation scheme and an employment protection policy are
in place and when search externalities are present. One configuration includes the case
of no wage tax, an employment subsidy set to oﬀset the distortions of unemployment
compensation and employment protection on the job destruction decision, and a hiring
subsidy that corrects any job creation distortion imposed by employment protection and
search externalities.
Computational experiments confirm that this ideal also determines the direction in
which significant marginal improvements in both eﬃciency and equity can be made.
However, simulation results also suggest that a hiring subsidy larger than that required
to oﬀset the eﬀects of employment protection typically reduce employment and income by
encouraging the replacement of old jobs with new too frequently. Finally, an employment
subsidy targeted at low-skill workers but financed by a wage tax on high wage workers,
a policy equivalent to an “earned income tax credit” in our framework, can induce
significant increases in the employment and wage of low-skill workers with little increase
in the unemployment rate of high wage workers.
There are many caveats to add concerning the limitations of the model used to draw
these conclusions, and qualifications that identify needs for future research. Important
among these is our assumption that the opportunity cost of employment as reflected in
unemployment contingent income, or the value of leisure, b in our notation, is indepen-
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dent of worker skill. This assumption is critical to the theoretical and computational
outcomes reviewed above. To a first approximation, the quantitative importance of out-
comes is proportional to the ratio of productivity to b. Empirical testing of this condition
is, therefore, an important topic for future research.
Other research topics are suggested by the need to consider alternative specifications
to those used here. For example, much has been made of worker “hold-up” possibilities
that arise because match specific investments made by employers in hiring, training, and
equipping a worker more generally are irreversible ex post. In this environment, workers
have an incentive to renege on any initial agreement to share these costs through a lower
wage. One parsimonious way to capture the eﬀects of this time consistency problem is
to assume that the initial wage is determined ‘as if’ the match specific investments were
made prior to the initial wage bargaining game. The result would be an initial wage
equal to the continuing wage at the initial value of the match specific component of
productivity, i.e., w0 = w(1) in the notation of the paper. As the employer incentives to
create job vacancies are lower under this “insider-wage” contract, a hiring subsidy might
be expected to perform somewhat better than under the investment sharing contract
assumed in the paper. The eﬀects given alternative methods of wage determination,
particularly those associated with the ‘eﬃciency wage’ hypothesis, might also be studied.
In their analysis of wage subsidies using a similar model to ours, Davidson and
Woodbury (1995) allow for endogenous worker search intensity. This generalization
adds nothing to this analysis from a purely theoretical point of view but does introduce
a new channel of influence for policy, skill, and bargaining power. Suppose the matching
function takes the form m(v, eu) where here e represents the search eﬀort of the typical
unemployed worker. Given the assumption that eﬀort reduces net value of leisure, say
it is equal to b(1 − e1/γγ ) where γ ∈ (0, 1), then one can show that optimal eﬀort is a
function of the market tightness. Formally,
be
1
γ−1 =
m(v, eu)
eu
(W0 − U) =
m(v, eu)
eu
β (J0 − C +H)
(1 + t) (1− β)
=
³ v
eu
´ βpc
(1 + t) (1− β)
where the first equality is the first order condition for an individual’s optimal choice
of eﬀort, the second is an implication of the bargaining outcome rule and the third
equality is implied by the free entry condition. As a result, one can simply substitute
appropriately to derive the reduced form matching function
M(v, u) = m
µ
v,
µ
βpc(v/u)
b (1 + t) (1− β)
¶γ
u
¶
.
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Given m concave and linearly homogenous, so is M, so the basic theory applies.
However, now the wage tax, skill productivity parameter and the “market power”
parameter have added direct eﬀects on the matching process given market tightness
θ = v/u and indirect eﬀects on the job creation and job destruction conditions. The
reduced form vacancy hazard is now
q(θ) =
M(v, u)
v
= m
µ
1,
µ
βpc
b(1 + t)(1− β)
¶γ
θγ−1
¶
. (35)
Otherwise, the job creation condition (23) holds as stated. Substituting b(1− γe1/γ) for
unemployment contingent income b on the right side of (22), we obtain the following
modified opportunity cost of employment
a+ (1 + t)(b(1− γe1/γ) + ρw¯)
p
+
β(1− γ)
1− β cθ − rT. (36)
The principal qualitative changes are reductions in the sensitivity of the vacancy hazard
and the opportunity cost of a match to the vacancy-unemployment ratio. In addition, a
wage tax now discourages search eﬀort which in turn reduces the equilibrium employer
incentive to create jobs, given the complementarity of vacancies and search eﬀort in the
matching function.
The Davidson and Woodbury specification also diﬀers from ours by assuming that
the total number of jobs available is fixed rather than endogenously determined by a free
entry condition. Not surprisingly, they conclude that a targeted subsidy will have a large
displacement eﬀect. Still, their result illustrates that our specification assumes a large
part of the crowding-out problem away. One way to introduce a middle ground would
be to assume that worker productivity depends on employment levels. For example, let
pi = fi(n1, n2) where ni = (1−ui)`i represents the employment level of skill group i and
where fi(˙.), the marginal product of skill i workers, allows for diminishing returns and
substitution between the two worker types.
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